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11 Introduction
Information asymmetries hamper capital markets in allocating capital across the most productive investment
opportunities. Firms in demand for capital need to inform potential capital market investors of the prospects of
their investment opportunities,but in doing so they may simultaneously inform third parties with countervailing
interests. The latter includes informing potential opponents like product market competitors, which may result
in the opponent taking some adverse actions that harm the ﬁrm. Particularly, ﬁrms that consider an initialpublic
offering are faced with this conﬁdential or proprietary information problem.
1 Instead of a public placement, the
ﬁrm can choose to issue privately which allows it to inform investors directly thereby reducing the incidence of
leakingproprietaryinformation. Theextenttowhichprivatecapitalmarketsmay mitigateproprietaryinformation
problems will typically depend on the difference in disclosure requirements with respect to the leakage of
proprietary information between both capital market types. In addition to these disclosure considerations, other
factorsmay inﬂuencethecostdifferentialbetweenbothcapitalsources. Inthispaper werelatepossiblecapitalcost
differences withthedisclosureproblemofleakingproprietaryinformationand showitseffect on thegoing-public
decision.
Financing and disclosure are two important corporate activities, whose interaction appears to be strongest
in the going-public decision. Central in our model are private ﬁrms that meet the requirements for listing and
that are faced with a (positive net present value) investment opportunity. We assume that the internal ﬁnancing
means fall short or that the investment outlay is just too high so that the ﬁrm has to look for outside ﬁnancing
opportunities.
The problem of selecting the appropriateﬁnancing source is not limited to sortingout the cheapest form of
capital. Other factors may also inﬂuence this choice. Amongst these are the costs related to the communication
with capital suppliers. A natural difference in communication costs between an initial public or private offering
are the higher direct costs to listing. Because these disclosure costs are too a large part ﬁxed, their inﬂuence
on the going-public decision is rather straightforward: the larger the capital need, the more attractive public
capital becomes, ceteris paribus. In the present study, we are much more interested in the more intangible and
important source of disclosure costs that stems from leaking conﬁdential information to opposing parties. We
posit that going-public has a large impact on the incidence of leaking conﬁdential or proprietary information.
First, a going-public ﬁrm has to deal with unknown investors that it can primarily reach via public disclosures.
Second, exchange authorities make high demands upon public disclosures. They normally impose additional
disclosurerules and watch more closely over thetimeliness,completeness and precisionof corporatedisclosures.
Third,publicﬁrms willattractmoreattentionfromﬁnancial analystsand thepress,which furtherincreases public
scrutiny. Finally, being caught for fraudulent disclosure in public has far more serious consequences. Litigation
and reputation costs, for instance, are likely to be higher because more investors will be harmed and the negative
1The focus is on initial public offerings, for these ﬁrms will experience the largest change in disclosure environment. Firms considering
a seasoned public offering may also consider proprietary information problems since each public offering itself comes with additional
(disclosure)requirements. These ﬁrms, however,have already experiencedthe conversionto a more demanding disclosure environmentand
havealreadyadaptedto the longer-termpublicdisclosurerequirements. Forthis reasonwe considertheinitial publicofferingﬁrm as the most
appropriate examplefor ourstudy.
2news will be disseminated more broadly. Summarizing, public ﬁrms will face more pressure on their disclosure
activitiesandwillhavelessﬂexibilityinchoosingtheirdisclosurechannels. Asaresult,disclosurecostsstemming
from the leakage of proprietary information, henceforth referred to as proprietary disclosure costs, are expected
to be higher for public ﬁrms and, hence, are likelyto affect a ﬁrm’s going-publicdecision.
This paper analyzes the inﬂuence of disclosure environments on the going public decision of the ﬁrm. In
ourgame-theoreticalmodel, aﬁrm canchoose toﬁnance itsbusinessontheprivateoronthepubliccapitalmarket,
each of which having its own cost of ﬁnance and disclosure regulations. The going public decision is then a
trade-off between the cost of ﬁnance and the disclosure related proprietary cost. Roughly speaking, we ﬁnd that
in equilibriumthe relatively better ﬁrms prefer private ﬁnancing to publicﬁnancing.
One of theﬁrst papers that explicitlyexamines the question why ﬁrms go publicis Pagano (1993). Pagano
views the going public decision as a trade-off between portfolio diversiﬁcation beneﬁts and listing costs. In his
model the propensity of a ﬁrm to go public within a particular economy depends on the going public decision
of other ﬁrm’s. The more ﬁrms are willing to bear the private listing costs the more efﬁcient can be the general
diversiﬁcationopportunities. Thisexternality,however, can createseveralequilibria,oneofthemfeaturingastock
market with very few companies listed. Zingales (1995) focuses solely on corporate control aspects associated
withgoingpublic. Inhismodelgoing-publicistheresultofavalue-maximizingdecisionmadebyaninitialowner
who wants to sell his company. By ﬁrst going public the initial owner can increase his gains from eventually
selling the whole company to a large shareholder.
2 Pagano and R¨ oell (1998) also view monitoring to be an
important consideration on the side of an initial owner in deciding how to offer equity. To balance the beneﬁts
stemming from the ﬁrm’s market value and future private beneﬁts, the initial owner weighs against each other
the cost of (over)monitoring
3 and the cost of providing a liquid market. The optimal solution contains some
level of monitoring and some measure of dispersion. An interesting prediction of the model that relates to ours
is that more stringent disclosure environments increase incentives to go public, because it offers more efﬁcient
monitoring.
In Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) the going public decision involves trading-off the bargaining power
of private investors against informationproductioncosts. Large shareholders have more bargaining power which
enhances thepossibilityofenforcingahigherreturnontheirinvestmentssoastocompensatetheidiosyncraticrisk
run on the relatively large shareholdings. By publiclyselling equity to numerous small well-diversiﬁed investors
the ﬁrm can mitigate the bargaining problem. Information production costs born by the issuer are higher in case
of public placements though. In the model ﬁrms go public only when a sufﬁcient amount of information about
them has accumulated in the public domain.
More related to our studyare Maksimovic and Pichler (1998b)and Yosha (1995). Instead of concentrating
2Other papers that consider an IPO as part of an overall value-maximizing strategy of selling a ﬁrm are Mello and Parsons (1998) and
Stoughton and Zechner(1998).
3In the paperthe term overmonitoringis used from the perspectiveof the initial ownerof the ﬁrm. Assumingthat he wants to keepcontrol
over the ﬁrm, the initial owner will also be interested in future private beneﬁts when selling part of the ﬁrm. In this case the optimal level of
monitoringfrom the perspectiveofotherinvestors,i.e. the levelofmonitoring thatmaximizes the marketvalue ofthe ﬁrm, neednot coincide
with the level of monitoring that maximizes the utility of the initial owner.
3on control issues, Maksimovic and Pichler (1998b) focus on the inﬂuence of leaking conﬁdential information to
product market competitors on the decision to go public or stay private. They too model the choice of outside
ﬁnancing as a trade off between a difference in cost of capital and indirect information disclosure costs. Their
focus, however, is more on the timing of the going-public decision than on the decision itself. All ﬁrms in their
analysis go publiceventually. Early investing ﬁrms in an emerging or chancing industrytrade-off the higher cost
of private capital against the higher likelihoodof prematurely informing potential entrants by going public at an
early stage. In contrast to the present study, they do not explicitlymodel the disclosureopportunitiesavailable to
publicand private issuers (i.e., they do not consider opportunitiesof strategic disclosure).
Yosha (1995) analyzes the effect of information disclosure cost on the decision between bilateral and
multilateral ﬁnancing, which can be related to private and public ﬁnancing, respectively. Besides utilizing the
somewhat uncommon view of public capital being more costly than private capital,
4 the effect of proprietary
cost on ﬁrm value is rather limited in that model. This becomes particularly clear if one abandons Yosha’s view
and supposes that private capital is relatively costly compared to public capital. For in that case, the effect of
proprietary cost on ﬁrm value is negligible and all ﬁrms prefer public to private ﬁnancing.
In our paper the ﬁnancing decision is the result of a trade-off between the cost of capital on the one hand
and proprietary cost on the other hand. With respect to the cost of capital, we consider both scenarios: public
capital may be cheaper or more costly than private capital. The ﬁrst scenario is believed to be the most general
one, however, adverse selection and agency costs can be so high for young and relatively unknown ﬁrms that
it can make public capital more expensive than private capital. In addition, the cost of capital may be deﬁned
more broadly than just the price set by the capital market. One may, for instance, also include the ﬁxed cost
involvedwithpreparinganddisseminatingtheinformationthatissubjecttodisclosureintheappropriatedisclosure
environment.
These two ﬁnancing scenarios are studied under two different disclosure regimes. First, we consider the
case in which ﬁrms must disclose their proprietaryinformationwhen they go publicand, second, we consider the
case in which ﬁrms can disclosethisinformationvoluntarily. In bothdisclosuresettingsit is assumed that private
ﬁrms do and can not publiclydisclosetheir proprietaryinformationin a credibleway;
5 they disclosetheir private
informationexclusively to their investors.
The appropriate disclosure environment depends on the extant disclosure rules of a particular exchange
applying to the informational item that is considered to be proprietary of nature. For example, if the proprietary
information can be thought of as the ﬁrm’s earnings ﬁgure,
6 a public ﬁrm in almost all developed countries is
obliged to disclose it, whereas in most jurisdictions - most notably that of the US - a private ﬁrm can withhold
4The explanationfor this is that a bilateral ﬁnancing arrangementinvolvescommunicationwith fewer agentsthan a multilateral ﬁnancing
arrangement. Therefore, private capital should be less costly. Herewith, Yosha (1995)disregards other factors that are generally believed to
be ofmore importancein distinguishingpublic from private capital, like liquidity and diversiﬁcationarguments. We referto Maksimovicand
Pichler (1998a) for a general explanation of the relatively lower cost of public capital. The cost of public capital needs to be distinguished
from the cost of ﬁnancing,which may differ due to other factors like proprietary disclosure costs.
5For example, because private markets lack disclosure standards that can be warranted by auditors or because private placements are
usually not warranted by an investmentbanker.
6Other generally used examples of proprietary information are earnings expectations and segmented information, although a large array
of corporate information has the potential of being proprietary in nature.
4it. In EU-countries, where disclosure rules are predominantlycode instead of listingbased, differences in formal
reporting requirements between public and potential public ﬁrms are smaller than in the US. One thus might
conclude that our model is less appropriate in these instances. A ﬁrm’s disclosure environment, however, is not
solely determined by formal reporting requirements. Issues like public scrutiny, and the changes of being caught
for breaking the rules as well as punishments adhered to it are as or even more important. It is clear that these
informal disclosure requirements are higher for public as for private ﬁrms.
7
The basic model that we present includes four risk neutral decision-makers: a privately informed ﬁrm,
the public and private capital market, and an opponent.
8 At some stage of the game, the ﬁrm receives private
information about its ﬁrm value, e.g. earnings. Private information ranges from relatively bad to relatively
good with the interpretation that better private information results in a higher ﬁrm value. The kind of private
information that a ﬁrm receives, depends on its type. Types can be ordered from good to bad on the basis of ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance, i.e. a better type receives valuable private information with higher probability. The
game is then played as follows. Dependent on its type, the ﬁrm decides between public and private ﬁnancing.
Since we consider theﬁnancing decision tobe the more fundamentaldecision withmore long-termconsequences
relative to the disclosure decision, the ﬁnancing decision is made before the ﬁrm receives its private information
in more detail. Once the ﬁnancing decisionis made, the ﬁrm learns its private informationabout ﬁrm value that it
disclosesintheappropriateway. Subsequently,thecapitalmarketsandthecompetitorobservetheﬁrm’sﬁnancing
and disclosure decision and update their beliefs about ﬁrm value accordingly. Dependent on these beliefs, the
competitor can decide to take an adverse action that imposes proprietary cost on the ﬁrm. It is assumed that
the competitor beneﬁts from taking the adverse action if and only if it believes that ﬁrm value exceeds a certain
thresholdvalue(cf. Wagenhofer(1990)). Thegoaloftheﬁrmistomaximizetheresultingﬁrmvalue, asperceived
by its investors, includingthecost of capital and theproprietarycost due to any adverse action by thecompetitor.
The second model introduces disclosure ﬂexibility for the public ﬁrm in that disclosure of the private
informationisnotlongermandated. Thissettingis applicablewhentheitem thatcontainsproprietaryinformation
is not subject to mandatory disclosure. Such a disclosure environment need notimply that the ﬁrm remains silent
about its private information. Verrecchia (1983) and Wagenhofer (1990) show that ﬁrms may have an incentive
to reveal their proprietary information. By introducing a voluntary disclosure environment for public ﬁnancing
the disclosuredecision gets separated from theﬁnancing decision. The possibilityof withholdingthe proprietary
informationis no longer directly attached to the choice of ﬁnancing.
We show that in these settings several sequential equilibria may arise. The two extreme cases are a full
privateﬁnancing equilibriumand a fullpublicﬁnancing equilibrium,in which all types chooseprivateand public
ﬁnancing, respectively. In the intermediate case of a partial ﬁnancing equilibrium, both privately and publicly
7In the model we develop the main disclosure differences between going public and staying private can be represented by the emission
prospectus that all public exchanges require newly listed ﬁrms to publish. This document can be seen as a device rendering credibility to
publicdisclosures. Mostoftheinformationit containsis usuallyauditedandadditionallybackedup bythe sponsor(s)andotherpartieswhose
reputationsare atstake. Althoughprivate ﬁrms haveto inform theircapitalsupplier(s)too, theydonothaveto follow as strict disclosurerules
leading to an equally secured prospectusthat can be publicly consulted.
8Forease of notationwe restrict ourselvesto oneopponent. The results presentedin this paperstill hold true though,if we allowfor more
than one opponent.
5ﬁnanced types occur. The existence of either equilibriumdepends mainly on the relative difference between the
proprietarycostandthecapitalcostdifferential. Furthermore,inapartialﬁnancingequilibriumonlytherelatively
better types opt for private ﬁnancing. The latter result can be explained as follows. Suppose that the cost of
private capital exceeds the cost of public capital. Then we can show that in equilibrium, the competitor refrains
from taking the adverse action when observing private ﬁnancing, implying that a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm incurs
no proprietary cost. Since private capital is relatively costly, private ﬁnancing is beneﬁcial only for those ﬁrms
that will most likely incur proprietary cost under the mandatory public disclosure rule of public ﬁnancing, i.e.
the relatively good types. Similar reasoning holds when public capital is relatively costly compared to private
capital. Then we can show that in equilibriumthe competitor will take its adverse action when observing private
ﬁnancing. Since public capital is relatively costly, public ﬁnancing is beneﬁcial only for those ﬁrms that will
most likely avoid incurring proprietary cost in case of public ﬁnancing, i.e. the relatively bad types. Hence, the
relativelygoodtypesﬁnance privately. Furthermore, theresultthatinapartialﬁnancingequilibriumtherelatively
good ﬁrms prefer private ﬁnancing turns out to be robust to changes in the disclosure environments.
Thepaper proceeds asfollows. Section 2 introducesand analyzes thebasic model inwhich publicﬁnancing
comes witha mandatorypublicdisclosure. ThenSection3discusses theadjustedmodelinwhichpublicﬁnancing
comes with a voluntary public disclosure. Section 4 presents some extensions and shows the robustness of our
results whileSection 5 discusses the implications of our study. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Let us start with providing a mathematical description of the model. First, all parties participating in the game,
i.e. the ﬁrm, the opponent, and the private and public capital market, are assumed to be risk neutral and rational
decision makers. At some stage of the game the ﬁrm will receive private information about its ﬁrm value that is












Examples of what this private information can represent are proﬁt ﬁgures, turnover, R&D expenses, production
costs, orproductquality. Infact, itcan begivenanymeaning, aslongasitcan berepresentedbyaone-dimensional
















y. Hence, we can interpret
y as relatively bad and
y as relatively good information. Furthermore,
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9 Since we assumed the ﬁrm to be risk neurtral, the ﬁrms objective of maximizing expected ﬁrm value is
equivalent to maximizing the expected change in ﬁrm value, which, in fact, can be represented by the change in
stock price. Hence, we can also state the ﬁrm’s objective as maximizing the expected change in stock price.
The kind of private information that a ﬁrm can receive, depends on its type
￿. Given a ﬁrm of type
￿,a l s o
referred toas ﬁrm
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v is strictly increasingandcontinuous,
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of the ﬁrm’s future value. Note that there are many factors that determine a ﬁrm’s potential performance. Some
of these factors like the product market in which it operates or the state of the economy are publicly observable.
Many other factors, however, like technology used, capacity, know how, and experience, are not. Since there is
no direct, veriﬁable evidence of how much each of these factors contribute to the ﬁrm’s potential performance,
we assume that it is impossible for a ﬁrm to make a credible revelation of its type to either the capital markets,
the opponent, or both. If the ﬁrm wants to communicate any information about its type, it can only do so by










] by assumption. A ﬁrm’s type is determined by a random variable
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￿ with probability distribution function
G and density function
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also Figure 1). Consequently, we can order ﬁrm types on the basis of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance from the
relatively bad type
￿ to the relatively good type
￿.
A description of the order in which the game is played is depicted in Figure 2. First, nature determines
the ﬁrm’s type. Subsequently, the ﬁrm makes its ﬁnancing decision while taking into account that each type




0. Furthermore, a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm can disclose its private information exclusively to its investor(s),





a mandatory public disclosure of its private information. Since we focus on the relation between the choice of
ﬁnancing and the disclosure environment, we assume that the ﬁrm can always acquire the necessary capital on
the market that it desires. Once the ﬁrm has made its ﬁnancing decision, the ﬁrm receives private information
about its ﬁrm value and discloses thisinformationin the appropriateway. We assume that due to some anti-fraud
ruletheﬁrm is not able tomisrepresent its informationso that any publicdisclosureis truthful. Subsequently,the
7Opponent and shareholders observe financing decision
Nature determines the firm’s typeq
Firm learns its type q and makes its financing decision
Nature determines the firm’s private informationyq
Firm learns its private information yq
Shareholders and opponent observe public disclosure (if any)
and update their beliefs about firm value
Opponent decides on his adverse action
Payoffs realize
A privately financed firm discloses yq exclusively
to its shareholders, and a publicly financed firm
discloses yq to the public
0
t
Figure 2: Time schedule of the game
opponentand the shareholders update their beliefs about ﬁrm value and the opponentmakes a decision regarding
hisadverse action. For modelingtheopponent’sbehavior we takethe same approach as Wagenhofer (1990). This









Since the disclosure environment completely determines a ﬁrm’s disclosure decision, the only decision

















public ﬁnancing. Note that in the forthcominganalysis we conﬁne ourselves to pure ﬁnancing strategies only, so
that randomization between private and public ﬁnancing is excluded.
In our model, we abstract from any agency problems, and assume that the manager of the ﬁrm strives to
obtain the goal of its investor(s), which is to maximize expected ﬁrm value including the cost of capital and
possibly the proprietary cost. With regard to the latter cost, recall that the opponent takes the adverse action, if
his beliefs regarding the expected ﬁrm value exceed a certain threshold value
K
2


























Y denotes the opponent’s beliefs about expected ﬁrm value. Note that since a publicly ﬁnanced
ﬁrm
￿ makes a mandatory public disclosure of its private information
y
￿, the opponent learns the ﬁrm’s private
information
y










) denote the opponent’s beliefs about the expected ﬁrm value of a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm


































0, then we can




b are privately ﬁnanced, his beliefs
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0 , then the conditionalexpectation does not exist. In







b may be considered as the so-called out-of-equilibriumbeliefs.





























































Now, we can determine the expected payoff of the ﬁrm. Since a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm of type
￿ can
disclose its private information exclusively to its investors, ﬁrm value equals
y
￿ minus the costs
C
b of private
capital and, in case the opponent takes the adverse action, minus the proprietary costs
C
p. The expected payoff


































































Note that the beliefs of the opponent only affect a privatelyﬁnanced ﬁrm’s payoff through the proprietary cost.
Since a publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrm of type
￿ makes a mandatory, truthful public disclosure of its private
information
y
￿, the opponent’s beliefs about the ﬁrm’s private information equal
y
￿. The expected payoff of




































































































) concerning the expected ﬁrm value upon observing private ﬁnancing, such that





















































































































) are as deﬁned in (2).




















). We will not go into theformal details of sequentiallyrational beliefs. For this,the interested reader is
referred to Kreps and Wilson(1982). If forsome typethe ﬁrm is indifferentbetween publicand privateﬁnancing,
it may arbitrarily choose one of them. Since we consider a continuum of types, the choice of the indifferent type
is irrelevant.













































0,t h e nw e
speak of a partial ﬁnancing equilibrium. The following theorem concerns the existence of full private and full
publicﬁnancing equilibria. The proof of this and all forthcoming theorems are provided in the appendix.
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A full public ﬁnancing equilibrium arises from skeptical beliefs of the opponent, which imply that the
opponent takes the adverse action whenever he observes private ﬁnancing. Skeptical beliefs, however, cannot
alwayssustain afullpublicﬁnancingequilibrium. Reason for thisisthat aprivatelyﬁnanced ﬁrm can exclusively
discloseitsprivateinformationtoitsshareholders. Consequently,theexactﬁrmvalueasperceivedbytheopponent
is not that important to the ﬁrm, it is only the action that results from these beliefs that counts. Then the worst
that can happen from the ﬁrm’s point of view is, that the opponent believes that the ﬁrm’s private information is
valuable enough to take the adverse action, for such beliefs result in proprietary cost for the ﬁrm. Thus, a full





b. For in that case,
the proprietary cost resulting from the opponent’s skeptical beliefs make private ﬁnancing even more costly, so
that each type prefers public ﬁnancing to private ﬁnancing. A full public ﬁnancing equilibrium, on the other




















b in capital cost. Thus, a fullpublicﬁnancing equilibriumonlyexists if theproprietarycost
C





b, so that private ﬁnancing becomes
more costly than public ﬁnancing for all possible ﬁrm types.








) abouttheﬁrm’sprivateinformation. These priorbeliefsandthevalue of
K determinewhether






b, and the opponent’s threshold value









), then a privately

















), then a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm can not avoid incurring proprietary
10cost in a fullprivateﬁnancing equilibrium. Consequently, privateﬁnancing is preferred to publicﬁnancing by all














to private ﬁnancing. Thus, a full private ﬁnancing equilibriumexists if the proprietary cost are sufﬁciently small





b. For in that case, therelatively low cost of privatecapital still
outweighs the proprietary cost.
















), then a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm can again avoid proprietary cost in a full private ﬁnancing

















m. Thus, a full private













































































































































































































m.S i n c e
the proprietary cost advantage increases with the ﬁrm’s type and the cost of capital does not, the relatively better
ﬁrms prefer privateﬁnancingtopublicﬁnancing ina partialﬁnancingequilibrium. Furthermore,ifprivatecapital
is relatively costly, then a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm does not incur proprietary cost, for otherwise it would have
gone public. This means that ﬁrms prefer private ﬁnancing to public ﬁnancing, if the additional cost of private
capital outweighsthe expected proprietarycost in case of publicﬁnancing. Since proprietarycost are more likely
to be incurred by the better ﬁrms, the better ﬁrms choose private ﬁnancing. Moreover, even though the opponent
knows that only the better ﬁrms ﬁnance privately, his threshold value
K is that high that it does not pay to take
the adverse action.
If public capital is relatively costly, then the opponent takes the adverse action when observing private
ﬁnancing. Hence, a ﬁrm cannot avoid proprietary cost by choosing private ﬁnancing. This means that private
ﬁnancing is preferred to public ﬁnancing if the cost advantage of private capital outweighs the possibility of
no proprietary cost in case of public ﬁnancing. Since the better ﬁrms have relatively little chance of avoiding
proprietary cost when publicly ﬁnanced, they prefer the cheaper option of private capital.





m, then only full ﬁnancing
equilibria exist. The explanation is straightforward. If there is no difference in capital cost, then the ﬁnancing
11decision is completely determined by the opponent’s action when observing private ﬁnancing. Suppose that the
opponent does not take the adverse action so that a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm avoids proprietary cost. If this is the
case, a full private ﬁnancing equilibrium results because public ﬁnancing yields proprietary cost with positive
probability. Similarly, suppose that the opponent does take the adverse action when observing private ﬁnancing,
so that a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm incurs proprietary cost. Then a full publicﬁnancing equilibriumresults, because
a publiclyﬁnanced ﬁrm incurs no proprietarycost with positiveprobability,
Summarizing, in a partial ﬁnancing equilibrium, the relatively better ﬁrms choose private ﬁnancing, what-
ever type of capital is more costly. Furthermore, private ﬁnancing is a means to avoid incurring proprietary cost




0 , partial equilibria cease to exist. Depending on which of the two types of capital is least costly, either a
full private or a full public ﬁnancing equilibriumarises.
3 Public Financing in a Voluntary Disclosure Environment
In this section we change the disclosure environment of a publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrm. Instead of a mandatory public
disclosure, a publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrm may now decide by itself, whether or not to disclose its private information
to the public. More speciﬁcally, we implement Wagenhofer’s voluntary disclosure model in our model so as
to introduce a less stringent disclosure environment for publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrms. The more ﬂexible disclosure
environment should make public ﬁnancing more attractive to the relatively good ﬁrms, for it offers publicly
ﬁnanced ﬁrms with additional possibilities to avoid proprietary cost. A voluntary disclosure environment is
applicable when the proprietary information is not subject to mandatory disclosure.
In this setting, a strategy of the ﬁrm comprises the ﬁnancing decision and, in case of public ﬁnancing, the

























￿ the publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrms, and
N


















￿. We maintain the assumptionthata publicdisclosure is truthfuland completely reveals the ﬁrm’s
private information.
Since the disclosure environment of a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm has not changed, the expected ﬁrm value for






























































































































are the opponent’s beliefs about the expected ﬁrm value of a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm (cf. (2)).
In order to determine the expected ﬁrm value for a publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrm, we ﬁrst have to determine the
opponent’sand the publiccapital market’s beliefs aboutﬁrm value when they observe nondisclosureofa publicly
12ﬁnanced ﬁrm. Similar to
￿










































































0 , then the conditional expectation does not exist. In this case, the beliefs about













































































































Since the goal of ﬁrm
￿ is to maximize the expected ﬁrm value as perceived by its investors, ﬁrm value in



































































































































































































































), the ﬁnancing and disclosure decision of the ﬁrm is













































Since sequential equilibria are subgame perfect, the (non)disclosure strategy
N
￿
￿ must be the optimal






















). This subgame shows great resemblance to the
voluntary disclosure model discussed in Wagenhofer (1990). In equilibrium, private information
y
￿ is disclosed
































































































































































































;. This equilibrium is supported by skeptical
beliefs. When the opponent and the publiccapital market observe nondisclosureof a publiclyﬁnanced ﬁrm, they

















the public. The nondisclosureset
N
￿
￿ is characterized by twointervals, one containingrelatively bad information
1
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he cannot ﬁnd out whether this is because the private information is good and the ﬁrm wants to avoid proprietary
cost, or just because the private information is bad. Since the latter thoughtalways dominates in equilibrium,the
opponent refrains from taking the adverse action when he observes nondisclosure.
The next propositionmakes a statement about how the equilibriumnondisclosuresets of publicly ﬁnanced


























































































































































Proposition 3.1 states that all publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrms essentially use the same disclosure strategy. The
intuition behind this proposition is clear. Since the opponent cannot distinguish between the various types of












m. As a result,either all publiclyﬁnanced ﬁrms play a fulldisclosurestrategy, or all publicly
ﬁnanced ﬁrms play the same partial disclosure strategy.
Since full disclosure yields the same payoff as mandatory disclosure, Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 also
apply if a full disclosure equilibriumoccurs.
Theorem 3.2
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A fullpublicﬁnancingequilibriuminvolvesskeptical beliefsaboutprivatelyﬁnanced ﬁrms. The advantage






























































. The latter advantage represents the misval-
uation of the ﬁrm by the opponent and the public capital market when they observe nondisclosure. Note that if
there is an undervaluation of the ﬁrm, there is actually a nondisclosure disadvantage for the publicly ﬁnanced
ﬁrm. Thus, in afullpublicﬁnancing equilibrium,theproprietarycost advantage and thenondisclosureadvantage





b for all types.
Skeptical beliefs about ﬁrm value of a publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrm is not necessary to sustain a full private
ﬁnancing equilibrium. If, however, such an equilibriumexists withother than skeptical beliefs, then also such an
equilibriumexists withskepticalbeliefs. In otherwords,ifskeptical beliefs cannotsustain afullprivateﬁnancing
equilibrium, than no other sequentially rational beliefs can sustain such an equilibrium. Furthermore, if private















which implies that the opponent refrains from taking the adverse action. So, although private capital is more
expensive, the beneﬁts from no proprietary cost is sufﬁciently high to make all ﬁrms prefer private ﬁnancing to
public ﬁnancing.
In a partial ﬁnancing equilibrium the relatively better ﬁrms still prefer private ﬁnancing. In this regard,
nothing has changed compared to a mandatory disclosure environment. In a voluntary disclosure environment
though, public ﬁnancing occurs more often than in a mandatory disclosure environment, because the opportunity
todisclosevoluntaryreduces theexpected proprietarydisclosurecost. This ﬁndingreﬂects thevalue ofdisclosure
ﬂexibilitythat arises when the disclosure of proprietary informationis not mandated.
4 Extensions and Related Issues
For bothdisclosureenvironments discussed thusfar it holdsthat ina partialﬁnancing equilibriumthebetter ﬁrms
prefer private ﬁnancing. Moreover, it can happen that privately ﬁnanced ﬁrms incur proprietary costs in a partial
ﬁnancing equilibrium. When this is the case, a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm might want to publicly disclose its private
information when this information turns out to be relatively bad, for a disclosure of bad information keeps the
opponent form taking the adverse action. Privately ﬁnanced ﬁrms, however, are assumed not to be able to make
credible public disclosures. Next, we examine how the results of Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 change if we
15allow for such public disclosures. It turns out that relaxing the disclosure rules in this way will not radically
change the equilibria: the relatively better ﬁrms still prefer private ﬁnancing to publicﬁnancing.
4.1 Credible Public Disclosures by Privately Financed Firms
Let us return to our basic model with mandatory public disclosures for publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrms, and suppose
that privately ﬁnanced ﬁrms are able to make a credible public disclosure about their private information. The
incentive to make such a disclosure arises when the opponent imposes proprietary cost on privately ﬁnanced
ﬁrms. For if this is the case, a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm with bad private information could still avoid proprietary
cost by publicly disclosing this information. Since such a disclosure environment makes private ﬁnancing more
attractive, we should expect to see more ﬁrms choose private ﬁnancing.












































￿, and that such a disclosure is truthfulby assumption.
In order to determine the expected ﬁrm value for a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm, we ﬁrst need to specify the
beliefs of the opponent when observing nondisclosure. We distinguishtwo cases. If nondisclosure by a privately
























0, then the updated beliefs















































0 , then the conditional expectation does not exist, so that the beliefs are






















) of the opponent when observing





















































































































￿ if a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm makes a public disclosure, the expected ﬁrm value














































































































m, the disclosure regulations are the same as in our basic model. Thus,













































































































































). Since the opponent’sbeliefs onlyaffect expected ﬁrm
value of a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm through the proprietary cost
C
p, the ﬁrm is indifferent between disclosure
and nondisclosure for many kinds of private information. For instance, if the opponent’s beliefs are such that a



































































































If in equilibrium the opponent does not take the adverse action when observing a nondisclosing privately




also some bad information should not be disclosed so as to keep the opponent from taking the adverse action.
For if it would only conceal information
y
￿
K, then the opponent would know that the privately ﬁnanced
ﬁrm possesses relatively good information
y
￿
K when he observes nondisclosure. Consequently, he would
impose proprietary cost on the ﬁrm. So, a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm should be careful not to release so much bad
information that it will change the opponents beliefs in such a way that he will take the adverse action when
observing nondisclosure.
If in equilibrium the opponent does take the adverse action when observing a nondisclosing privately
ﬁnanced ﬁrm, then a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm discloses all its relatively bad information, i.e.
y
<
K . Note that




Furthermore, note that if bad information
y
<
Kis disclosed to the public, then the opponent’s beliefs when
observing nondisclosure always exceed the threshold value
K. Hence, no inconsistency arises.
Theorem 4.2
















m then a fullprivate ﬁnancing
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1 (cf. Theorem 2.2), and the opponent refrains from taking the adverse action when



























A full publicﬁnancing equilibrium is driven by skeptical beliefs, which means that the opponent takes the
adverse action whenever he observes nondisclosure by a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm. The existence of a full private
ﬁnancing equilibriumwhen private capital is less costly than public capital is obvious. For in that case, private
ﬁnancing with full disclosure of informationdominates publicﬁnancing.
The opportunityto credibly disclose private information to the public, does not change the preferences of
the ﬁrms between private and public ﬁnancing. Compared to the situationwhere privately ﬁnanced ﬁrms cannot
make any credible public disclosures, exactly the same ﬁrms opt for private ﬁnancing. The only difference is
that partial ﬁnancing equilibria can only exist when private capital is relatively costly. That a partial ﬁnancing
equilibriumdoes not exist in the oppositecase, is due to the fact that a privatelyﬁnanced ﬁrm can choose to fully
17discloseitsprivateinformationtotheopponent. Bychoosingthisdisclosurestrategy, theﬁrmmimicsthebehavior
of a publiclyﬁnanced ﬁrm. Thus, the difference between private and public ﬁnancing is just the difference in the
cost of capital. Since private capital is less costly than public capital, all types prefer private ﬁnancing and a full
private ﬁnancing equilibriumarises.
4.2 Credible Voluntary Disclosures for Private and Public Financing
In the second relaxation, we allow voluntary credible public disclosures by both publicly and privately ﬁnanced
ﬁrms. Hence, as in the former subsection, a private ﬁrm can make a credible public disclosure in addition to
informing its private investors exclusively. A publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrm is no longer compelled to reveal its private















),w h e r e
￿
b describes the privately
ﬁnanced ﬁrms,
￿
m the publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrms, and
N




For determiningthe expected payoff for bothtypesof ﬁnancing, recall that thebeliefsof theopponentwhen
he observes nondisclosure by a privately and a publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrm, are given by (12) and (6), respectively.
Hence, the expected ﬁrm value for private and public ﬁnancing equals (13) and (7), respectively.


















), the ﬁnancing and disclosure decision are optimal with








































). Subgame perfection implies that
Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 4.1 hold true. Furthermore, if a full disclosure equilibrium arises for publicly
ﬁnanced ﬁrms, Theorem 3.2 also applies.
Theorem 4.3
(a) A fullpublicﬁnancing equilibriumfeaturing partialdisclosurealways exists if (9) holdsand ifpubliccapital
















m then a fullprivate ﬁnancing

















































































2 (cf. Theorem 3.2). Furthermore, in
































Again, a full public ﬁnancing equilibrium involves skeptical beliefs by the opponent when he observes
nondisclosure by a privatelyﬁnanced ﬁrm. Skeptical beliefs by the opponentimpose proprietary cost on the ﬁrm
so that it wants to disclose all its bad information. Such a disclosure strategy, however, elicits the same behavior
of the opponent as a full disclosure strategy for a publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrm. And since public capital is relatively
cheap, all ﬁrms prefer public ﬁnancing to private ﬁnancing. Note that in contrast with the previous models, a full
publicﬁnancing equilibriummay also exist if publiccapital is relatively costly. This equilibriumwillonlyarises,
of course, if the beneﬁt from nondisclosure by publicly ﬁnanced types is sufﬁciently large.
Since a full private ﬁnancing equilibrium features skeptical beliefs, the optimal disclosure strategy of a
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Figure 4: Firm value and proprietarycost with multipleopponents
If in a partial ﬁnancing equilibriumprivatelyﬁnanced ﬁrms can avoid proprietary cost, then the possibility
for privately ﬁnanced ﬁrms to credibly disclose their information to the public does not make private ﬁnancing
moreattractive. Comparedtotheenvironmentthatexcludessuch disclosures,thesame typeofﬁrms preferprivate
to public ﬁnancing. If, however, in a partial ﬁnancing equilibrium the opponent imposes proprietary costs on a
nondisclosingprivatelyﬁnanced ﬁrm, we cannotdraw any conclusionsbutthatpubliccapital mustbe more costly
than private capital.
4.3 Multiple Opponents
In modeling the opponent’s behavior, we took the same approach as Wagenhofer (1990). This means that the
motives behind the opponent’s actions are not explicitly modeled. Instead, it is assumed that of all the decisions
that theopponentmay make to obtainhis goal, onlyone imposes a ﬁxed proprietarycost on theﬁrm. In addition,
it is assumed that the opponent takes this decision if and only if he believes that ﬁrm value is sufﬁciently high.
Agentsthatmay actas anopponentincludeforinstanceproductmarketcompetitorsandgovernmental authorities.
The present model, however, onlytakes intoaccount one opponent. The results of our studyremain validthough,
if we allow for more than one opponent. In the case of
n opponents, each opponent






















n. This means that if the opponents
1











),t h e n















i (see Figure 4).
Notethatthisgeneralizedsetupcanalsobeusedtovarytheheightoftheproprietarycostwiththeopponent’s
beliefs. So instead of yes or no proprietary cost, the proprietary cost may, for instance, be absent for low ﬁrm
values, low for average ﬁrm values, and high for high ﬁrm values.
1
2Since all opponentsbehaverationally and possess the same information,they form identical beliefs aboutﬁrm value.
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Figure 5: The existence of the different ﬁnancing equilibriain relation to the exogenous variables.
5 Implications of the Model
Our analysis shows that in equilibriuma relatively good ﬁrm prefers privateﬁnancing to publicﬁnancing. In this
regard, relativelygoodrefers totheprobabilitydistributionof theprivateinformationthat such a ﬁrm can receive.
That a ﬁrm possesses valuable private informationneed not necessarily imply that the ﬁrm is of a relatively good
type, for even a relatively bad ﬁrm may possess valuable information from time to time. As a result, a single
proﬁt ﬁgure is no unambiguous indicator of a ﬁrm’s type. Indicators of a ﬁrm’s type should provide information
about the probability distribution of ﬁrm value like a (time) series of proﬁt ﬁgures does
1
3 or a ﬁrm’s long term
proﬁtability,i.e. a ﬁrm’s permanent earnings. Regarding the latter as a reasonable indicator of a ﬁrm’s type and
assuming that a positiverelationexists between theﬁrm’s proprietaryinformationand its proﬁtability,our results
state that private ﬁrms are more proﬁtable in the long term than public ﬁrms. This inference is in line with the
empirical results of Brav and Gompers (1997), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Ritter (1991), who observe a
long-rununderperformance by IPO’s.









K partly determine the existence of the several
ﬁnancingequilibria. To illustratetherelationbetween theexogenous variablesand apartialﬁnancingequilibrium


































]. Figure 5 shows the existence of the








p , the ratio between the difference in capital cost and the
proprietary cost.
Since a full public ﬁnancing equilibriumfeatures skeptical beliefs of the opponent when observing private
ﬁnancing, private ﬁnancing yields proprietary cost with certainty. In accordance with Theorem 2.1, we see that
a public ﬁnancing equilibrium always exists if public capital is relatively cheap compared to private capital.
1
3To havea properviewofthe proﬁtﬁgures overtime, the time series should,ofcourse,be appropriatelyadjustedforfactorslike economic
growth and inﬂation.
20Reason for this is that a publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrm may avoid proprietary cost with positive probability. Hence,
public ﬁnancing has a capital cost advantage and a proprietary cost advantage. In addition, if the proprietary
cost advantage of public ﬁnancing is sufﬁciently large compared to the capital cost disadvantage, a full public




1 has the following explanation. If
K
￿
1 then a ﬁrm of type
￿
￿
K will always incur
proprietary cost when it opts for public ﬁnancing. Since in that case there is no proprietary cost advantage for
publiccapital, this ﬁrm prefers the cheaper optionof private capital.










), then the opponent will not impose proprietary cost on a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm.
Since public capital yields proprietary cost with positive probability, private ﬁnancing comes with a capital cost
advantage and a proprietarycost advantage, so thatall ﬁrms prefer privateto publicﬁnancing. Note, however, that
even if theproprietarycost advantageof privateﬁnancing is sufﬁcientlylarge, a fullprivateﬁnancingequilibrium






incur proprietary cost when it opts for public ﬁnancing. Since in that case there is no proprietary cost advantage









), then the opponent
will impose proprietary cost on a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm. Since public ﬁnancing yields no proprietary cost with
positive probability, there is a proprietary cost disadvantage for private ﬁnancing. Then a full private ﬁnancing
equilibriumonly arises if private capital is sufﬁciently cheap compared to publiccapital.











]. Figure 6 pictures the
￿
￿




















j. Furthermore, one can derive that more ﬁrms prefer private ﬁnancing when the threshold
value









p decreases. Note, however, that theeffect











m, privately ﬁnanced ﬁrms avoid incurringproprietarycost in a partial ﬁnancing equilibriumotherwiseit
wouldnot exist. If the proprietarycost increases, then the expected proprietary cost of public ﬁnancing increases






b. In that case, privately ﬁnanced ﬁrms incur proprietary cost in a partial ﬁnancing equilibrium.
If the proprietarycost increase, then the cost beneﬁt of private ﬁnancing does no longer outweigh the proprietary
cost for the relatively bad privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm. Hence, they prefer public ﬁnancing.
It is a straightforward exercise to show that similar interdependencies can be derived for the general case
in which public ﬁnancing is subject to mandatory disclosure. Since Theorem 3.2 states that under a voluntary
disclosurerulemore ﬁrms go publicina partialﬁnancing equilibriumthan undera mandatory disclosurerule, the
interdependencies should follow similar trends in a voluntary disclosure environment. So, we pose that public








p increases. This assertion leads to the
followingimplications.



















information is relatively high for competitive markets.
1
4 Thus, competitive markets are characterized by high
proprietarycost, a lowthresholdvalue, or both. As a result, oneshouldobserve more privateﬁrms in competitive
markets where private capital is more costly than public capital. Two remarks are in place here. First, our model
does nottakeintoaccount differences intheriskofreturnsof differentﬁrms. Firms inhighlycompetitivemarkets
mayhave moreriskyreturns,makingthepremiumforbearingidiosyncraticriskincase ofprivateﬁnancinghigher.
Instead, publiccapital markets allow better risksharing opportunities. Hence, the capital cost difference for risky
ﬁrms is larger and thereforeit is difﬁcultto say what overall effect an increase in product market competitionhas
on the going-publicdecision. Second, if the abilityto hide proprietaryinformationin highlycompetitivemarkets
ismoredifﬁcult,
1
5 theinﬂuenceofdifferences inthedisclosureenvironmentsattached tothealternativeﬁnancing
opportunitiesreduces.
When proprietarycost is related to theentry ofa new competitoronthe productmarket, a market withhigh
entry barriers may be represented by a high threshold value. Assuming that the proprietary cost resulting from
entry is ﬁxed, public ﬁnancing should become more attractive as the entry barrier increases. This result links up
with Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999). They suggest that ﬁrms from more capital intensive industries go public
earlier.
As in Yosha (1995) our model supports ﬁndings of positive stock price responses to the announcement of
private equity or debt placements. Firms that are on to something good might choose to attract private capital to
prevent having to disclose publicly about their investment plans. This consideration is also applicable in case of
seasoned offerings.
1
4Harris (1998), however,ﬁnds evidence that might point to a negativeassociation between proprietary cost and competition. Her ﬁnding
suggests that a reluctance towards disclosure is highestfor ﬁrms enjoyingabnormalreturns. Assuming that abnormalreturns are more likely
in less competitive industries yields a negativeassociation.
1
5Competitivemarketsare typically characterizedby less information asymmetry,e.g. becausethe competitionfor proprietaryinformation
is also higherin such markets.
22Finally,ourmodelmayalsohave implicationsconcerningthediscussionabouttheuniﬁcationofaccounting
rulesacross jurisdictions. To theextent thatproprietarydisclosurecostconsiderationsinﬂuence a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing
decision, the decision to list on a domestic or foreign public capital market can be driven by differences in
disclosure requirements. For instance, American public security markets are generally believed to be the most
liquidmarkets. These markets, however, are also known to have the most stringentdisclosure regimes.
1
6 Hence,
a ﬁrm considering an (initial) public offering of securities might forego the liquidity advantage offered by the
NYSE, ASE, or NASDAQ because proprietary cost considerationsmakes a listingto a less demanding disclosure
environment more attractive. This result is in contrast with Huddart, Hughes and Brunnermeier (1999) who
ﬁnd that when several public markets compete in trading volume disclosure requirements increase. Their model
considerably differs from ours, particularly in the modeling of the proprietary cost and how disclosure resolves
the informationassymmetry.
To return to our model, the proprietary cost argument might help to explain why we do not see all IPO’s
to be executed on American public capital markets. Moreover, our model predicts that it are the relatively worse
(foreign) ﬁrms that will enter American stock exchanges. With regard to the ongoing efforts of harmonizing
accounting rules worldwide, the former argument might explain why stock market authorities are reluctant in
changing their disclosure requirements for listing to meet GAAP. Uniform disclosure regulations across capital
markets favors thosemarkets that offer theleast capital cost. Hence, representatives of less liquidcapital markets,
i.e. non-US capital markets, may oppose GAAP proposals that reduce disclosure ﬂexibility in fear of loosing
their competitive disclosureadvantage. On the other hand, US market ofﬁcials might oppose obscure accounting
proposals in an attempt to protect their liquiditylead.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes how differences in disclosure regulations between private and public capital markets may
affect the ﬁrm’s going-publicdecision. Disclosureregulationsprescribe which ofthe ﬁrm’sprivate informationis
subject to disclosure. Particularly, any conﬁdential information that is subject to disclosure may lead to the ﬁrm
incurring proprietary cost. In our study, the going-publicdecision is a trade-off between the difference in capital
cost and the difference in proprietary disclosure cost. The main result of our analysis is that the relatively better
ﬁrms remain private and that the relatively bad ﬁrms go public. The latter result might explain the minimum
requirements for going-publicthat currently exist at public capital markets.
Our model implies that ﬁrms for which proprietary disclosure cost considerations are important, are more
likely to stay private as the private information that is proprietary in nature becomes more valuable. If this latter
property can be associated with the value of growth opportunities, our model shows that the more valuable a
ﬁrm’s growth options, the more attractive private ﬁnancing becomes. This implies that the recent tendency for
young fast- growing ﬁrms to enter public markets across jurisdictionsmay say more about differences in capital
cost, particularlydifferences in the efﬁciency of privateﬁnancing opportunities,than that itsays something about
the relevance ofconﬁdentialinformationin IPO-decisions. Furthermore, ouranalysis conﬁrms the general notion
1
6Moel(1999)documentsa difference in the rigor of disclosure rules across different American security markets.
23that more stringent disclosure requirements for public ﬁrms decrease the likelihoodof an IPO due to an increase
in expected proprietary disclosure cost.
There are of course several other factors inﬂuencing the public/privateﬁnancing decision that may confuse
proprietarydisclosure cost considerations. A prominentcandidate foradditionalpublicﬁnancingcost thatare not
consideredinthepresentstudy,arecostsstemmingfromagencyproblemsbetweenmanagersandinvestors. Foras
longas these costs are ﬁxed, they can be captured in our model by broadeningthedeﬁnitionof thecost of capital.
It may well be, however, that these costs vary with the quality of the ﬁrm. Underinvestment problems like those
introduced by Myers (1977) become more serious for lower quality ﬁrms. Chances that a ﬁrm’s management
creates or discovers proﬁtableinvestments increases withthequalityof theﬁrmand itsmanagement. In instances
where the ﬁrm’s management wants to forego positive NPV-projects, a few private capital investors has better
opportunities to redirect the management’s investment decision than a large group of public investors has. The
introductionof such an agency cost may change our results in such a way that a disjointset of privately ﬁnanced
ﬁrms arise ina partial ﬁnancing equilibrium: besides the relativelybetter ﬁrms, also therelatively bad ﬁrm prefer
staying private. The latter do so to beneﬁt from the private investors inﬂuence on management.
7 Proofs
































Y , so that the expected ﬁrm value for a








































p. Note that a privately
ﬁnanced ﬁrm can exclusively disclose its information to its investor(s), so that the beliefs of the opponent






























































































































































































































































































































































￿, it follows that (14) is satisﬁed for all
￿
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Since the right hand side is decreasing in




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.S i n c e

































































0 . For if this is not the case, a ﬁrm of
type































































































































































) is decreasing in
￿.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿ prove the result.
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) f o raﬁ r mo ft y p e
￿. From (21), it then followsthat a full































































￿. From Lemma 7.1 we know that the left hand side of the inequality is decreasing in
￿. Hence,





































































1 , it followsthat a fullpublicﬁnancing equilibriumexists if and

























































0 in a partial ﬁnancing equilibrium, the opponent’s beliefs




























































































b. By Lemma 7.1 the right hand side of (23) decreases in











































































































































































b if (15) is satisﬁed. Subgame perfection implies that in a partial disclosure equilibrium, the equilibrium
disclosure strategy yields a higher payoff than full disclosure. Hence, the right hand side of (15) is less than or















0. By subgame perfection, the payoff from private ﬁnancing exceeds the payoff from


















































































































































￿ . This implies that private































￿. For determiningthe expected ﬁrm
valueofa publiclyﬁnanced ﬁrm, we mustﬁrstspecifytheopponent’sandshareholder’sbeliefswhen theyobserve









Y . Given these beliefs, the
optimal disclosure strategy for a publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrm is to disclose its private information if and only if this
disclosure yields a ﬁrm value higher than
y













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































N. Thus, a full private ﬁnancing equilibrium












































































































holds true for all
￿
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) is decreasing in
￿.
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) be a sequential equilibrium. Note that by subgame























































































































































































































































































































).T h e n ﬁ r m
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Rearranging terms then yields that a ﬁrm
￿
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0 ,s ot h a tﬁ r m
￿
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K , a full public ﬁnancing equilibrium exists, if (24) is violated for all
￿
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) is decreasing in












































































































































































) is decreasing in
































































































































































































































































































































































































































) is decreasing in


































































































0. Since this inequalitydoes
not depend on
























0. So, no partial ﬁnancing
equilibriumexists.
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Y .L e t
N
￿
Y denote the optimal disclosure strategy given the beliefs
y
































































































































































￿. Since the expected payoff for a privately ﬁnanced ﬁrm is minimal when
￿
￿


























































































































































































































































Y denote the optimal disclosure strategy given the beliefs
y














































































































































































The expected payoff for a publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrm is minimal when the beliefs
y
m induce full disclosure, which is














g. Since publicly ﬁnanced ﬁrms fully disclose
their private information, the proof continues in the same way as the proof of Theorem 4.2(b).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since the left hand side is decreasing in
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